crime and punishment

Here is a rant that I’ll have to edit and clarify as I read it over a few times. Sorry that it is so scattered, but I wanted to get my train of thought down while these thoughts are in my head. I’m not going to end up where I started, but hey, its my blog and I’m allowed to just think at the keyboard.

Don’t you hate it when you react strongly to a situation and then react equally strongly to the opposite situation at another time? Usually, this happens to me when the situations seem to be extremes of the spectrum. I have reacted strongly to “hate crime” legislation because usually when I hear the term being tossed about, I feel that either the motivation can’t be clear in this crime, and “hate crime” makes it sound more newsworthy, or the consequence to the victim is the same no matter the motivation.
Now I know that to a degree, discernment of motivation is required to rule in murder versus manslaughter cases, etc. But when there is no doubt the crime is murder, I’ve often questioned whether it is apt to determine the motivation to be hatred motivated by race or something else. So my problem is not discerning motivation, but with intention having been determined, discerning what was the motivation for the hate itself. That is what hate crime law must deal with. If someone is murdered because they are mean, is that less a crime than if someone is murdered because they are gay? The severity of the punishment is contingent upon the heart of the criminal

Tuesday, Todd Bertuzzi punched Steve Moore in the side of the head. Moore hit the ground, Bertuzzi came after and a dog pile ensued. Moore suffered a fractured neck, concussion and other injuries. Back on February 16, Moore hit the Canuck team captain Naslund and sidelined him for 3 days. Moore didn’t even receive a penalty in the game in February. So all that is to say this. What if Moore had not been seriously injured? At least no more seriously than Marcus Naslund was? Is the severity of the crime and the punishment judged by the severity of the damage to the victim? Does intent play any role? If Moore had received only a bloody nose, would Bertuzzi have been penalized 5 minutes and it would have blown over? Pre-meditated or not, it was a hockey game and Moore had delivered similar stuff to Naslund already.
So in the one case, I’m bothered that heart is being judged to determine the severity of the punishment. In the other case, I’m wanting heart to be examined rather than just the condition of the victim. Why can’t I be consistent in the way I’m reacting here?

I’ve been visiting these thoughts all day and have chased some pretty weird rabbits. Seems everything that comes across my mind these days has to be filtered through Willard’s discussion of the mountain talk. So heart. It really matters doesn’t it? As I’ve chased the rabbits, I’ve come to realize that my inconsistency in reacting to these two scenarios is at least partially due to the fact that they are related. We are more concerned with a crime that affects us directly. Therefore, punishment should be contingent upon the consequences of the crime rather than the guilt of the one committing the crime. Here is how they are connected.
In the hockey case, it is obvious. Bertuzzi caused greater damage to Moore than Moore did to Naslund. Bertuzzi’s punishment must be more severe. There are observable consequences. In the hate crimes scenarios, there are social implications that must be considered. Not unlike the hockey case, except in that scenario, the implications weren’t recognized until retaliation had taken place. If someone is injured or killed as a result of a robbery, we will be upset, but not concerned that we are in danger. If someone is killed because of racial, gender, or sexual orientation bias, then we will worry about segments of society clashing and widespread retaliation. That could more easily affect us personally.
In the Christian community, it seems that heart condition should be the concern of everyone involved on either side of wrong doing. But in fact, even here, the severity of the consequence is more important than the severity of the sin. What’s worse, our concern with morality is based on social acceptance rather than right and wrong. If you are sinning and it doesn’t affect me, I’m less apt to be concerned with your spiritual well being.
This explains why we as a community can sit back and ignore a lost world when they are behaving publicly according to social mores that are in line with our beliefs. But when it becomes acceptable to stop hiding immoral behavior, we begin to look for a way to legislate morality that doesn’t threaten us. We are still not concerned for those who are offending us, we’re just concerned that they are offending us. We try to legislate morality and good behavior.
Bring the scenario inside the church and you find sexually active teenagers who disappoint their parents until one becomes pregnant. Then they devastate their parents. This is why it is less wrong for boys to be sexually active than for girls. Because boys can’t get pregnant. We are more concerned with reputation and social standing than with spiritual condition and well being. In our moral climate it is perfectly ok to be sexually active outside of marriage, but not ok to have a baby outside of marriage. This is an embarrassment. Sex is not bad. Babies are bad.
Knowledge of this thought pattern must reek havoc on teenagers and young singles. We don’t need to hide the behavior, just the results. Our lack of concern with the heart condition leaves us open to continue to sin and desire to hide it with increasingly greater sin. We need to teach, care for and encourage before the result of sin becomes something that can’t be swept under the rug and ignored.